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I
n the late summer months of 2009, a government
program helped nearly 700,000 owners of old cars
replace them with new vehicles. The Car Allowance
Rebate System (CARS), better known as “Cash for Clunk-
ers,” is credited with stimulating auto sales and gross
domestic product (GDP) in the third quarter of 2009. It’s
an example of an economic stimulus program that attempts
to accelerate consumption — or, better yet, spur entirely
new consumption — to provide an immediate boost to
economic activity. 
The program, in effect primarily in July and August of
2009, granted rebates between $3,500 and $4,500 for car
buyers who traded in older vehicles with low fuel efficiency
to purchase new vehicles with better gas mileage (plus a few
other criteria). Generally, the greater the improvement in
fuel efficiency from the swap, the higher the rebate granted.
The program required the clunkers to be destroyed, 
getting relatively fuel inefficient cars off the road. Strong
demand quickly consumed the program’s $3 billion 
budget, which ended the program on August 24, earlier than
anticipated.
The program was popular, and without a doubt provided
a short-term boost to the economy. But that’s not enough 
to know whether its benefits outweighed its costs.
Economists say its immediate stimulus should be weighed
with its medium- and long-term effects.
With a program like Cash for Clunkers, many economists
worry first about efficiency. By making cars artificially
cheaper to consumers, the program distorts the allocation of
resources. Economic theory suggests that prices derived
from freely functioning markets will coordinate buyers 
and sellers until all mutually beneficial transactions are
exhausted. This outcome will be “efficient,” meaning no one
can be made better off unless you take from someone else to
do it. The catch is, to produce this powerful result, prices
must be allowed to reflect how goods and services are truly
valued.
This basic idea can easily be applied to the Cash for
Clunkers program. The program’s rebates distorted that
powerful price mechanism. When that happens, resources
are less likely to be allocated to where society values them
most. Those resources include everything from car supplies
and labor to the energy it takes to produce a new car, all of
which arguably could have been used to produce something
that provided greater societal benefits. 
CARS Costs and Benefits
In addition to economic stimulus, program onlookers 
anticipated a host of desirable side effects, ranging from
environmental benefits to assistance to low-income groups.
Others noted distortions to secondary markets affected by
auto sales and what economists call an economic “payback”
effect later. 
The array of possible short- and long-term effects makes
it hard to gauge the program’s success, but analyzing its 
initial costs and benefits is one way to start. CARS had a
temporary stimulative effect on auto sales and economic
growth. Monthly auto sales jumped from a 9.5 million 
annual rate in the first half of 2009 to 11.2 million in July and
14 million in August while the program was in effect. 
Automakers ramped up production to make up for the
inventory depleted under the program, which provided a
boost to GDP.  A report by the White House’s Council of
Economic Advisers (CEA) estimates the boost from Cash
for Clunkers to the auto sector directly added $3.6 billion to
GDPin 2009, and about 35,000 “job-years” (one job held for
one year) in the second half of 2009. 
But this effect is temporary. Once the short-term produc-
tion is exhausted, the demand for those jobs will likely 
be too. Furthermore, cars purchased during the program
were cars that would have been bought at some point in 
the future, whether months or years later. Automakers will
sorely miss that demand later when those purchases would
have taken place. Because CARS borrowed demand from
the future, auto sales and GDPwill face a dip in those future
months that will tend to offset the boost in the third quarter
of 2009. 
To be sure, the CARS program likely brought some
clunker owners into the market who otherwise would have
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 held on to their cars for years to come. Estimates of this
number range widely, with many hovering around one-third
of all CARS purchases. Nonetheless, to the extent that
demand came from the near future, there will be what is
called a “payback” effect on economic trends. The payback
is the amount of consumption that was borrowed from the
future, and therefore will be absent from sales in those
future months. The trouble is, we can’t know for sure from
what future date demand was borrowed, so the impact of the
payback will be hard to measure. Even if auto sales dip after
the program’s end, this will not necessarily be due to the pay-
back effect because auto sales are notoriously volatile from
month to month. And since CARS borrowed consumption
from an unknown future date, it follows that any payback
should be spread more benignly over many months or even
years.
Yet if auto sales don’t dip, it could indicate a strengthen-
ing economy rather than proof that the payback is small.
Vehicle sales for September, after the program’s close,
dipped back to below-trend levels seen earlier in 2009, with
initial signs of recovery in October and November. On the
flip side, a Cars.com survey reports that consumers who par-
ticipated in CARS planned to scale back holiday season
shopping as a result, potentially revealing an unintended
effect that will eat into the program’s boost to the overall
economy. The CEA’s best estimate of the payback is a drop
in GDP in the first half of 2010 that will more than reverse
the boost provided by CARS in 2009. 
Secondary Effects
CARS also may have borrowed demand from the used car
market since some car purchasers would have been in the
market for a used car instead. That implies less of a payback
for the new car market, but pain for used car sales (as well as
used car supply, since many clunkers would have gone into
the used car market). This could have significant distribu-
tional effects. It was suggested by some commentators 
that the program would benefit primarily lower-income 
people, who would seemingly be the predominant owners of
clunkers. But this may not have been borne out.
“I think for the most part the people who partook of this
largesse by the government were people who drove clunkers
by choice, not economic necessity, because if you were driv-
ing a clunker by economic necessity, you did not have the
money to go into the market,” says economist George
Hoffer of Virginia Commonwealth University. 
In the months leading up to the program, reports of cred-
it difficulties pervaded the auto industry. Sales reportedly
fell through because financing was scarce. Before Cash for 
Clunkers, the No. 1 problem for new car sales was credit, 
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The Auto Industry in the Fifth District
The transportation industry in the Fifth District includes
manufacturers, automotive parts suppliers, and the biggest
used-car retailer in the nation, CarMax, headquartered in
Richmond, Va. Manufacturers include the BMW plant 
in Spartanburg, S.C., and Toyota Motor Manufacturing in
Buffalo, W.Va., which produces engines, automatic trans-
missions, and gears. However, the moribund vehicle market
has affected profits and, in some cases, the very existence of
several suppliers. 
In Virginia, Alcoa Wheel Products in Lebanon and steer-
ing-parts maker JTEKT in Daleville have announced
closings. Nevertheless, the firms are continuing to produce
in the short-term because the federal Cash for Clunkers
program generated a short burst of demand, according to
Mike Lehmkuhler of the Virginia Economic Development
Partnership. Others haven’t been so lucky. GM plans to
close its Fredericksburg powertrain plant by year’s end in
2010. But some suppliers in the state are weathering the
downturn. For instance, Dynax in Botetourt County 
remains in the business of producing clutch/friction plates
for automatic transmissions. 
Transportation-related manufacturing employment has
dropped dramatically in South Carolina. At the end of first
quarter 2009, the sector employed about 27,000, down from
32,537, the annual average for 2007, according to Steve
McLaughlin, a labor analyst at the S.C. Employment
Security Commission. North Carolina has seen layoffs in the
transportation sector too. Annual average transportation-
related employment was 34,773 in 2007. First quarter 2009
employment in the sector, however, fell to 26,095, according
to the N.C. Employment Security Commission. 
In West Virginia, however, transportation sector employ-
ment is stable, according to Joe Doran of Workforce West
Virginia. Most of the firms are small, with the exception of
the Toyota plant in Buffalo. Employment in the first quarter
of 2009, when compared to the same period in 2008,
declined 3.4 percent, from 2,059 workers to 1,989.
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Hoffer says, yet “there was not one word about credit 
problems during Cash for Clunkers.” This may imply CARS
participants had good credit, large down payments, or both. 
All are consistent with a higher income population.
Richmond, Va.-based CarMax lobbied Congress unsuc-
cessfully to include used cars in the program. Had the
program included used cars, it might have benefited the less-
wealthy, who tend to be more active in the used-car market,
Hoffer says. “It would have been more income-neutral.”
Environmental benefits were a selling point for the pro-
gram too. But they’re not as straightforward as they appear.
Many vehicles scrapped under the clunkers plan would have
gone into the used-car market, so CARS removed older pol-
luting cars from the road. All else equal, this should have
reduced emissions. CARS participants enjoyed a 9.2 MPG
increase in fuel efficiency, on average. This will certainly 
be a direct benefit to drivers of those cars: Consumer Reports 
estimates that will save owners $720 apiece in annual fuel costs.
But scrapping the clunkers produces carbon, as do new
car production processes. Perhaps more important, many of
the clunkers likely were driven less than the new replace-
ments will be. These owners now have more comfortable
fuel-efficient cars that are cheaper to drive and thus likely to
be driven more. This will eat into emission savings. Hoffer
believes it could even produce more emissions for a number
of cars, not less. The bottom line is that assessing the envi-
ronmental benefits of CARS requires looking deeper 
than just the car-for-car improvement in fuel efficiency.
Jaws of Life for the Auto Industry
Like any economic stimulus, CARS is likely to be more
effective when there are idle economic resources, a descrip-
tion that certainly matched the economy in 2009. But it
matters why resources are idle. By most accounts, the auto
industry has faltered because its products are not highly val-
ued relative to competitors. The program may have
provided only a temporary reprieve to an industry facing a
long-term structural decline. And since two of the Detroit
Three were effectively closed for the summer, when the
vehicles started selling, they couldn’t take advantage of the
sales momentum, Hoffer notes.
Moreover, the program used valuable economic
resources to replace still-functioning cars. Destroying those
productive assets represents a loss of welfare to society.
That’s why a true estimate of the program’s net benefits
must also subtract the value of the destroyed assets.
It is not easy to quantify this welfare loss. One could even
argue that the cost is small, since the program affects a small
number of cars relative to the total number on the road. But
more important, if policy broadly used artificially low prices
to affect individual decisionmaking in an attempt to subsi-
dize industries precisely because they are not highly valued,
then the distortions and unintended consequences could
produce losses that may overwhelm the gains. RF
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markets and the forming of investor expectations in both 
positive and negative ways. Regulations like disclosure laws 
can help markets become more efficient by making informa-
tion widely available. But a too-large public safety net that 
convinces market participants they will not have to 
bear all or most investment losses can induce investors to
rationally take risks they otherwise would not have.
Financial market participants may have taken market effi-
ciency for granted, as Fox believes. The only scenario that
would be at odds with what the EMH really says would be one
in which information had been accessible and market partici-
pants just didn’t use it. Yet the vast majority of economists,
policymakers, and financial market participants did not see
the financial crisis coming, perhaps indicating that such infor-
mation about the true risk was not there for the taking. Or
perhaps parties who ignored information about the risks were
rationally responding to perverse incentives to do so. 
Economists don’t yet fully understand all the factors 
that might cause markets to occasionally get prices wrong. 
To explain this, you can favor behavioral theories on 
psychology and investor biases, errors of regulation, or 
perhaps just a pervasive difficulty of accessing information
due to characteristics of the market in question. But none of
these explanations are inherently at odds with the EMH.
Studying the financial crisis with the benefit of hindsight
will help economists, investors, and policymakers better
understand the causes behind fluctuations in asset prices for
which there is no easy explanation. RF